


On Ridesharing Competition and Accessibility: Evidence from Uber, Lyft, and Taxi



Shan Jiang, Le Chen, Alan Mislove, Christo Wilson



Northeastern University

Outline

- **Background**
- **Data collection**
- **Results on competition and accessibility**

Background: Why study ridesharing?

Ridesharing is shifting Vehicle for Hire (VFH) market.

- The Treasurer Office of SF estimates that there are over 45,000 Uber and Lyft drivers (2016);
- The SF Municipal Transportation Agency has issued only 2,026 taxi medallions;
- In the New York City, Uber and Lyft cars are now estimated to outnumber taxis 4 to 1 (2016).

	Taxi 	Uber  / Lyft 
Price	Fixed by law	Set by company
Accessibility	Required to serve the entire city	No requirement
Data	Providing data report	Mostly no detailed data shared

Ridesharing is **NOT** transparent! -> Auditing?

Background: Auditing is hard

Uber Shares Its Data with the City of Boston

by **STEVE ANNEAR** • 1/13/2015, 11:40 a.m.




Highly touted Boston-Uber partnership has not lived up to hype so far

By **Adam Vaccaro** June 16, 2016

Only share **highly aggregated** data, cannot be used for analysis.

Background: What do we care?




Competition:

- Competition between Uber and Lyft (ridesharing market);
- Competition between ridesharing (Uber and Lyft) and taxis (VFH market).

Accessibility:

- Citywide factors (population, transportation, etc);
- Potential algorithmic discrimination (diverse neighborhood, low-income area, etc).

Data collection: Analysis of mobile traffic



You see a map with:


- price;
- estimated waiting time;
- 8 nearby cars.

```
{
  timestamp: 1523482986,
  surge_multiplier: 1.2,
  estimate_waiting_time: 60,
  nearby_cars: [
    {
      car_id: 0000001,
      locations: [ (timestamp1, lng1, lat1), (timestamp2, lng2, lat2), ... ]
    },
    .....
    {
      car_id: 0000008,
      locations: [ (timestamp1, lng1, lat1), (timestamp2, lng2, lat2), ... ]
    }
  ]
}
```

Your phone sees a JSON encoded data traffic with:

- current surge multiplier;
- estimated waiting time;
- timestamped trajectories of GPS locations of 8 nearby cars.

Data collection: “Blanketing” cities



“Blanketing” cities with emulated users to collect data.

- Fully covered SF, covered most part of NYC;
- Records data every 5 seconds;
- Nov 12 - Dec 22, 2016 in SF, Feb 1 to Feb 27, 2017 in NYC for Uber and Lyft;
- Collaborated with SFCTA to get taxi data Nov 1 - Dec 30, 2017.

Data collection: Ethics

NO personal information collected.

- All identifiers are opaque IDs.


NO impact on ridesharing platforms, drivers or riders.

- We only observed nearby cars, and never requested any actual rides;
- Our infrastructure has the same behavior as ordinary smartphone apps.

Positive impact on the society.

- SFCTA report: <http://www.sfcta.org/tncstoday>
- Visualization: <http://tncstoday.sfcta.org>
- Regulation in process...

Data preprocessing: Inferring supply and demand



Aggregate data to get index of market features (block-group level, 5-minute window).

- **Supply:** the number of available cars;
- **Demand:** the number of disappearing cars;
- **Price:** the average price;

* More details in our paper.


Temporal analysis: Daily patterns

Daily patterns:

- Supply and demand patterns are similar;
- 2 peaks on weekdays and 1 peak on weekends;

Between Uber and Lyft:


- Uber has 2× more supply and demand than Lyft;
- Supply is similar (SF: $r=.90^{***}$, NYC $r=.91^{***}$);
- Demand is similar (SF: $r=.94^{***}$, NYC $r=.92^{***}$);
- Price is similar (SF: $r=.82^{***}$, NYC $r=.89^{***}$).



Between ridesharing (Uber and Lyft) and taxis:

- Taxi supply is between Uber and Lyft at daytime but more at night. But demand is much lower;
- Supply patterns are less similar (Uber/Taxi: $r=.53^{***}$, Lyft/Taxi: $r=.53^{***}$);
- Demand patterns are less similar (Uber/Taxi: $r=.62^{***}$, Lyft/Taxi: $r=.58^{***}$).


Temporal analysis: Utilization rate



Utilization rate of Uber, Lyft and taxis drivers:

- Uber and Lyft drivers spend on average ~1 minute idling;
- Taxi drivers spend on average ~10 minutes idling;
- This finding holds when we examine the distribution over different time of a day.

Temporal analysis: “Shared” drivers




“Shared” drivers that work for Uber and Lyft at the same time:

- Detect such driver if there are “similar” trajectories in both Uber and Lyft data;
- “Similar”: Appearing at similar time, GPS locations are similar, and disappear at similar time;
- Under most conservative estimation, ~1.5% in SF and ~0.5% in NYC.

* More details in our paper.


Spatial analysis: Distribution in cities



Spatial patterns:

- Supply and demand patterns are similar (not shown in the figure, $r > .80^{***}$);
- For supply and demand, Uber, Lyft and taxis are similar ($r > .80^{***}$);
- For price, Uber and Lyft are less similar (SF: $r = .67^{***}$, NYC $r = .57^{***}$).

Spatial analysis: A peek at accessibility



How many block-groups has a “full-time” driver visited?

- “Full-time”: Appearing in our data for more than 30 days;
- Assumption: Full-time drivers should have ample time to serve the majority part of the city;
- Mean visited block-groups: 261 for Lyft (~45% of SF), 503 for taxis (~87% of SF);

This does **NOT** mean that Lyft is serving only half of the city.

Accessibility: What do we care?

Transportation infrastructures:

- Public transit stops, on-street parking meters, off-street parking lots, etc.
- Civil engineering perspective, how ridesharing interact with existing infrastructure?
- Good control variables.
- Data sources: Open data platforms of SF and NYC, Department of Transportation website, etc.

Socioeconomic factors:

- Population density, race and ethnicity, income, education, etc.
- Fairness perspective, are there any potential discrimination?
- Data sources: American Community Survey (ACS), Census, etc.

Accessibility: Spatial econometrics

Classical econometrics with OLS not working:

$$y = \beta \mathbf{X} + \epsilon, \epsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$$

- Significant spatial endogeneity among observations (Moran's I test, $p < 0.001$);
- Intuitively, this means that the supply or demand of an area is highly affected by its neighbors;
- This leads to over-estimation of classic econometrics with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).

Spatial econometrics - Lag model:

$$y = \rho \mathbf{W} y + \beta \mathbf{X} + \epsilon, \epsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$$

- Spatial endogeneity is captured by spatial matrix W ;
- Estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML);
- There are “spillovers”, i.e., the effect on one area will affect another area;
- There are direct effects and indirect effects, combined as total effects.

Accessibility: Fitting results...

Table 1: Estimated average total effects coefficients of citywide (independent) features for four VFH market (dependent) features from spatial lag models in SF. Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.001$.**

Average Total Effects	Supply (#/5min)			Demand (#/5min)			Price (multiplier)		Wait Time (seconds)	
	Uber	Lyft	Taxi	Uber	Lyft	Taxi	Uber	Lyft	Uber	Lyft
Constant	3.1019**	1.8456**	1.8975	-0.1031	0.1492	-0.1745	1.0228***	1.0771***	2.2396**	1.4378*
Spatial Weight	0.0727***	0.0878***	0.0643***	0.0509***	0.0645***	0.0585***	0.002*	0.0006	-0.0064	0.0005
Population Density (#/m ²)	-12.4385	-17.98	60.9386*	-8.9152	-4.5352*	2.8619	1.3017***	-0.8465	-41.3405***	-27.9079**
Public Transit Stops (#)	0.0361*	0.0135	0.0472*	0.0181***	0.0039**	0.0061***	-0.0007**	-0.0018***	0.0274***	0.0251***
On-Street Parking Meters (#)	0.0136***	0.0047***	0.0085***	0.0066***	0.002***	0.0013***	0.0001***	0.0001**	-0.0013***	-0.0009**
Off-Street Parking Lots (#)	0.2053***	0.0818***	0.3268***	0.0744***	0.0248***	0.0227***	-0.0	0.0006	-0.0207*	-0.0198*
White Number (hundreds)	0.05*	0.0283*	0.1104***	0.0266***	0.0112***	-0.0186***	0.0	0.0011	0.0068	0.0051
Median Income (thousands)	0.0031	0.0021	-0.0023	0.0006	0.0002	0.0005	-0.0	0.0	-0.0031	-0.0036*
Median Education Level (year)	-0.1118	-0.076*	-0.0032	0.0058	-0.0011	0.0159*	0.0037**	0.003	0.0235	0.0306
Family Ratio (%)	-2.3186***	-1.121***	-2.5165**	-0.3969*	-0.2002***	-0.1211	0.046***	-0.1046***	1.7422***	1.7647***
R ²	0.8469	0.8012	0.7307	0.8802	0.7947	0.7124	0.5576	0.3566	0.515	0.4837
Sample Size	556	556	556	556	556	556	166	166	166	166

Table 2: Estimated average total effects coefficients of citywide (independent) features for four VFH market (dependent) features from spatial lag models in NYC. Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.001$.**

Average Total Effects	Supply (#/5min)			Demand (#/5min)			Price (multiplier)		Wait Time (seconds)	
	Uber	Lyft	Taxi	Uber	Lyft	Taxi	Uber	Lyft	Uber	Lyft
Constant	1.7557**	0.8486***		0.4218***	0.1343***		1.0175***	1.0245***	2.8244***	2.883***
Spatial Weight	0.108***	0.1036***		0.0893***	0.0933***		-0.0042	-0.0003	-0.0287	-0.0171
Population Density (#/m ²)	-7.8304*	-5.0664***		-3.1914***	-1.0124***		0.4845	0.2053	-12.9185***	-16.4425***
Public Transit Stops (#)	-0.0227	-0.0101		-0.0042	-0.0009		0.002	-0.0011*	0.0287*	0.0301*
On-Street Parking Meters (#)	0.0421***	0.0141***		0.0122***	0.0032***		-0.0004	0.0001	-0.0042*	-0.0035
Off-Street Parking Lots (#)	0.5518***	0.1671***		0.184***	0.0446***		0.0051	-0.0007	-0.0197	-0.038
White Number (hundreds)	-0.0083	0.0004		0.0017	0.0005		0.0005	0.0001	0.0213**	0.0228**
Median Income (thousands)	0.007***	0.0017**		0.001**	0.0002		0.0002	-0.0001	-0.0021	-0.004*
Median Education Level (year)	-0.0457	-0.0218		-0.0238**	-0.0067***		-0.0035	0.0019	-0.0363	-0.0184
Family Ratio (%)	-1.7693***	-0.6729***		-0.236***	-0.0699***		0.0147	-0.0145	1.3459***	1.7871***
R ²	0.811	0.7473		0.7366	0.7373		0.0225	0.0816	0.3608	0.3756
Sample Size	2451	2451		2451	2451		250	250	250	250

Let's go through some interesting results.

Accessibility: Transportation infrastructure

Average Total Effects	Supply (#/5min)			Demand (#/5min)			Average Total Effects	Supply (#/5min)			Demand (#/5min)		
	Uber	Lyft	Taxi	Uber	Lyft	Taxi		Uber	Lyft	Taxi	Uber	Lyft	Taxi
Constant	3.1019**	1.8456**	1.8975	-0.1031	0.1492	-0.1745	1.7557**	0.8486***		0.4218***	0.1343***		
Spatial Weight	0.0727***	0.0878***	0.0643***	0.0509***	0.0645***	0.0585***	0.108***	0.1036***		0.0893***	0.0933***		
Population Density (#/m ²)	-12.4385	-17.98	60.9386*	-8.9152	-4.5352*	2.8619	-7.8304*	-5.0664***		-3.1914***	-1.0124***		
Public Transit Stops (#)	0.0361*	0.0135	0.0472*	0.0181***	0.0039**	0.0061***	-0.0227	-0.0101		-0.0042	-0.0009		
On-Street Parking Meters (#)	0.0136***	0.0047***	0.0085***	0.0066***	0.002***	0.0013***	0.0421***	0.0141***		0.0122***	0.0032***		
Off-Street Parking Lots (#)	0.2053***	0.0818***	0.3268***	0.0744***	0.0248***	0.0227***	0.5518***	0.1671***		0.184***	0.0446***		
White Number (hundreds)	0.05*	0.0283*	-0.1104***	0.0266***	0.0112***	-0.0106***	-0.0083	0.0004		0.0017	0.0005		
Median Income (thousands)	0.0031	0.0021	-0.0025	0.0006	0.0002	-0.0005	0.007***	0.0017**		0.001**	0.0002		
Median Education Level (year)	-0.1118	-0.0768*	-0.0032	0.0058	-0.0061	0.0159*	-0.0457	-0.0218		-0.0238**	-0.0067***		
Family Ratio (%)	-2.3186***	-1.1234***	-2.5165***	-0.3969*	-0.2072***	-0.1211	-1.7693***	-0.6729***		-0.236***	-0.0699***		
R ²	0.8469	0.8012	0.7303	0.8802	0.8747	0.7124	0.811	0.7473		0.7366	0.7373		
Sample Size	556	556	556	556	556	556	2451	2451		2451	2451		

Transportation matters.

- Three factors (public transit, on- and off- street parking) in supply and demand for all Uber, Lyft and taxis services are strongly significant (mean p<0.01);

Transportation matters more than population!

- Population is mostly not significant (mean p>0.3) when transportations are included;
- If we remove transportations, population becomes significant (mean p<0.05).

Accessibility: Socioeconomic factors

Average Total Effects	Supply (#/5min)			Demand (#/5min)			Average Total Effects	Supply (#/5min)			Demand (#/5min)		
	Uber	Lyft	Taxi	Uber	Lyft	Taxi		Uber	Lyft	Taxi	Uber	Lyft	Taxi
Constant	3.1019**	1.8456**	1.8975	-0.1031	0.1492	-0.1745	1.7557**	0.8486***		0.4218***	0.1343***		
Spatial Weight	0.0727***	0.0878***	0.0643***	0.0509***	0.0645***	0.0585***	0.108***	0.1036***		0.0893***	0.0933***		
Population Density (#/m ²)	-12.4385	-17.98	60.9386*	-8.9152	-4.5352*	2.8619	-7.8304*	-5.0664***		-3.1914***	-1.0124***		
Public Transit Stops (#)	0.0361*	0.0135	0.0472*	0.0181***	0.0039**	0.0061***	-0.0227	-0.0101		-0.0042	-0.0009		
On-Street Parking Meters (#)	0.0136***	0.0047***	0.0085***	0.0066***	0.002***	0.0013***	0.0421***	0.0141***		0.0122***	0.0032***		
Off-Street Parking Lots (#)	0.2053***	0.0818***	0.3268***	0.0744***	0.0248***	0.0227***	0.5518***	0.1671***		0.184***	0.0446***		
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Median Income (thousands)	0.0031	0.0021	-0.0025	0.0006	0.0002	-0.0005	0.007***	0.0017**		0.001**	0.0002		
Median Education Level (year)	-0.1118	-0.0768*	-0.0032	0.0058	-0.0061	0.0159*	-0.0457	-0.0218		-0.0238**	-0.0067***		
Family Ratio (%)	-2.3186***	-1.1234***	-2.5165***	-0.3969*	-0.2072***	-0.1211	-1.7693***	-0.6729***		-0.236***	-0.0699***		
R ²	0.8469	0.8012	0.7303	0.8802	0.8747	0.7124	0.811	0.7473		0.7366	0.7373		
Sample Size	556	556	556	556	556	556	2451	2451		2451	2451		

Family ratio is the most important socioeconomic factor.

- Family ratio in supply, demand and price for all Uber, Lyft and taxis services are mostly significant (mean $p < 0.001$);

There are “residual” correlations for diverse and low income areas.

- In SF, Uber and Lyft supply is significant increasing (mean $p < 0.05$) with Caucasian number.
- In NYC, Uber and Lyft supply is significant increasing (mean $p < 0.001$) with median income.

Caution: Effect size is small. * More details in our paper.

Takeaways: Time to wake up!

Competition:

- In the ridesharing market, Uber and Lyft are similar in supply and demand, but different in pricing mechanisms; A small percent of drivers work for Uber and Lyft at the same time;
- In VFH market, ridesharing (Uber and Lyft) are different in supply and demand (and price of course) to taxis, which makes them utilized more efficiently than taxis.

Accessibility:

- Ridesharing (Uber and Lyft) and taxis services are all centered at transportation hubs, and areas with low family ratios;
- Ridesharing (Uber and Lyft) shows “residual” correlation with minority and low-income areas, which could cause potential discrimination, but the effect size is small.

Thanks!

Questions?


Shan Jiang

Email: sjiang@ccs.neu.edu



Northeastern University


Data validation: Comparison with historical data



Ground truth using a previous opened small Uber dataset in NYC:

- Point pattern statistics: K value;
- **NO** significant different.

Accessibility: Effect size in SF



Accessibility: Effect size in NYC

